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DOUBLE FOR NOTHING? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE






How does a large unconditional increase in salary affect the performance of in-
cumbent employees in the public sector? We present experimental evidence on this
question in the context of a policy change in Indonesia that led to a permanent dou-
bling of teacher base salaries. Using a large-scale randomized experiment across
a representative sample of Indonesian schools that accelerated this pay increase
for teachers in treated schools, we find that the large pay increase significantly
improved teachers’ satisfaction with their income, reduced the incidence of teach-
ers holding outside jobs, and reduced self-reported financial stress. Nevertheless,
after two and three years, the increase in pay led to no improvement in student
learning outcomes. The effects are precisely estimated, and we can rule out even
modest positive impacts on test scores. Our results suggest that unconditional pay
increases are unlikely to be an effective policy option for improving the effort and
productivity of incumbent employees in public-sector settings. JEL Codes: J31,
J45, I21, C93, O15.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The level and structure of public-sector compensation play a
key role in the ability of governments to attract, retain, and mo-
tivate high-quality employees and to deliver services effectively
(Finan, Olken, and Pande 2017). As a result, countries some-
times implement large increases in public-sector salaries to at-
tract higher-quality applicants to government jobs and to better
motivate existing employees (see, e.g., Govt. of India 2008, 2015).
While such salary increases may improve the quality of new em-
ployees hired over time, they also lead to substantially higher
salary spending on existing employees, with large fiscal costs that
crowd out other public expenditure.1 Thus, understanding the ex-
tent to which unconditional pay increases make incumbent public-
sector workers more motivated and productive is a key considera-
tion in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of such salary increases.
There is limited evidence on this policy-relevant question, in
part because conducting empirical research in public-sector per-
sonnel economics is difficult. Challenges include measuring em-
ployee productivity in the public sector and generating exogenous
variation in the pay of public-sector workers. A growing experi-
mental literature examines how changes in public-sector compen-
sation affect worker productivity, but most studies to date have fo-
cused on pilots of performance-linked bonus programs, as opposed
to the unconditional pay increases that are much more typical in
bureaucracies (see Finan, Olken, and Pande 2017 for a review).
represent the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated
organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the gov-
ernments they represent.
1. Compensation to government employees constitutes one of the largest items
of public expenditure in most countries, representing an average of 24.5% of to-
tal government spending in high-income countries, and 27% in low- and middle-
income countries (International Monetary Fund 2016). In labor-intensive sectors
like health and education, the average share of salaries in government spending
rises to 42.8% and 65.6%, respectively (Clements, Gupta, and Nozaki 2013). Thus,
across-the-board salary increases are very expensive. For instance, the uncondi-
tional salary increases to government workers awarded by the recent seventh
Pay Commission in India raised government expenditure by 0.65% of GDP and
required forgoing or deferring capital investments to meet fiscal deficit targets
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In this article, we provide experimental evidence on the im-
pact of a large unconditional salary increase on the effort and
productivity of incumbent public employees. Our study was con-
ducted in the context of a policy change in Indonesia that per-
manently doubled the base pay of eligible civil service teachers
who went through a certification process.2 The reform moved
teacher salaries from the 50th to the 90th percentile of the college-
graduate salary distribution. Civil service teachers in Indonesia
also enjoy generous benefits and high job security, and quit rates
were very low even before the pay increase. Thus, the teachers in
our study are typical of public-sector employees in many low- and
middle-income countries, who hold highly coveted jobs and enjoy a
significant wage premium relative to their private-sector counter-
parts with similar observable characteristics (Finan, Olken, and
Pande 2017).
Given the large fiscal burden of the policy, teacher access to
the certification program was phased in over 10 years (from 2006
to 2015), with priority in the queue being determined by seniority.
Thus, many “eligible” teachers had to wait several years before be-
ing allowed to enter the certification process. Working closely with
the Government of Indonesia, we implemented an experimental
design that took advantage of this phase-in. It allowed all eligible
teachers in 120 randomly selected public schools to access the cer-
tification process and the resulting doubling of pay immediately;
in contrast, teachers in control schools experienced the “business
as usual” access to the certification process through the gradual
phase-in. The study was conducted over a three-year period, in
an almost nationally representative sample of 360 schools drawn
from 20 districts and all major regions of Indonesia.
Our experiment successfully accelerated access to the certifi-
cation process and doubling of pay for eligible teachers in treat-
ment schools. It resulted in a 29 percentage point increase in the
fraction of teachers in treatment schools who had been certified
and received the salary supplement at the end of two years, and
a 24 percentage point increase at the end of three years (relative
2. The policy was designed to reward a process of teacher skill upgrading
(signaled by “certification”) by providing a certification allowance that was equal
to the base pay (thereby doubling base pay). However, in practice, the certification






/qje/article/133/2/993/4622956 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 26 M
arch 2021
996 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
to the control group).3 Among the “target” teachers (who were el-
igible but not certified at the baseline), there was a 54 (and 45)
percentage point increase in teachers who were certified and re-
ceived their salary supplement at the end of two (and three) years
in treatment schools (relative to control schools).
The experiment significantly improved measures of teacher
welfare: at the end of two and three years of the experiment,
teachers in treated schools had higher income, were more likely
to be satisfied with their income, and were less likely to report
financial stress. They were also less likely to hold a second job, and
they worked fewer hours on second jobs (the last two differences
are significant after two years, but not after three).
Despite this improvement in incumbent teachers’ pay, sat-
isfaction, and time available to focus on their main job (due to
a reduction in second jobs), the policy did not improve either
their effort or student learning. Teachers in treated schools did
not score better on tests of teacher subject knowledge, and we
find no consistent pattern of impact on self-reported measures
of teacher attendance. Most important, we find no difference in
student test scores in language, mathematics, or science across
treatment and control schools. The point estimates are close to
0 and precisely estimated, allowing us to rule out effects as
small as 0.05 standard deviations (σ ) at the 95% level in treated
schools. We present nonparametric plots of quantile treatment ef-
fects and find no effect on test scores in treated schools at any
point in the test score distribution. Finally, we use the school-
level random assignment as an instrumental variable for being
taught by a certified teacher in a given year and find no im-
provement in student test scores from being taught by a cer-
tified teacher (relative to students in control schools taught by
similar “target” teachers). These effects are also precisely esti-
mated, allowing us to rule out effects larger than 0.1σ at the 95%
level.
3. Roughly 20% of teachers in both treatment and control schools were already
certified at baseline, and another 25% of teachers were not eligible for certifica-
tion at baseline, because they were either not civil service teachers or not college
graduates. It is the remaining 55% of teachers who were “eligible but not certified”
at the baseline (whom we describe as “target” teachers) who were affected by the
experiment, and it is this population of teachers for whom the experiment accel-
erated access to certification and induced a significant increase in pay. Note that
the “first stage” of the experiment weakens over time as the certification rate in
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Our results suggest that several posited mechanisms by
which an unconditional salary increase could lead to improved
effort and productivity of incumbent workers may not have ap-
plied in our setting. For instance, it is often argued that increasing
employee pay in nonincentivized prosocial tasks like teaching or
health care may reduce time spent on outside jobs and increase
time and effort on the primary job (UNESCO 2014). Advocates of
higher pay also point to models of reciprocity and gift exchange
where employees pay back employers for a wage premium with
an effort premium (Akerlof 1982, Falk 2007). Finally, qualitative
studies have argued that low pay makes it difficult for managers
to demand accountability from employees who are considered un-
derpaid, and that higher pay would foster greater professionalism
and adherence to standards (Webb and Valencia 2006).
It is important to note that our results are from a large-scale
experimental evaluation of a policy change that aimed to improve
education quality. By design, such policy experiments are unlikely
to yield a precise theoretical test of any one of the mechanisms
listed above.4 However, from a policy perspective, we are more in-
terested in whether such an expensive policy (which costs over 5%
of the national budget) improved the effort of incumbent teachers
and learning outcomes of their students through any combina-
tion of the posited mechanisms. Our results suggest that even
the composite effect of these mechanisms was negligible in this
setting.
Our main contribution is to the literature on the personnel
economics of the public sector. We are not aware of any experi-
mental study to date on how a large unconditional salary increase
affects the productivity of incumbent public employees. The most
closely related article is Mas (2006), which finds that police per-
formance in New Jersey deteriorated when arbitrators awarded
4. For instance, reciprocity may require that the “gift” of a higher salary
be received from an employer whom the employee interacts with regularly, as
opposed to being from a more distant taxpayer. It is also possible that the gift
being exchanged is not higher classroom effort for higher pay but support from
teacher unions to politicians in return for a pay increase. But our results do suggest
that there was unlikely to have been a gift-exchange/reciprocity channel from
higher pay to better job performance in this setting. They are also consistent with
recent evidence suggesting that any increases in worker productivity in response
to an unconditional increase in pay may be short-lived (Gneezy and List 2006;
Jayaraman, Ray, and de Véricourt 2016) or nonexistent (Kube, Maréchal, and
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a lower pay increase than the one proposed by unions (relative to
cases where the union proposal was accepted). One possible expla-
nation for the seeming contrast with our results is gain-loss asym-
metry around a reference wage point, with worker performance
deteriorating in response to a pay cut relative to expectations but
not improving in response to an unconditional increase in pay (see
Kőszegi and Rabin 2006 for theory, and Bewley 1999 and Kube,
Maréchal, and Puppe 2013 for evidence). Since we study the effects
of a large increase in salaries relative to the status quo, our re-
sults are not inconsistent with Mas’s (2006) finding that employee
performance does not improve with the gap between actual and
expected pay when pay is above the reference point.
We contribute to the literature on teacher pay and student
performance. Our results are consistent with prior studies find-
ing no correlation between increases in teacher pay and improved
student performance in the United States (Hanushek 1986; Betts
1995; Grogger 1996). However, these past results have been ques-
tioned for not having adequate exogenous variation in teacher pay,
for failing to control for nonwage compensation and differences in
local labor markets (Loeb and Page 2000), and for being based
on changes in pay that may be too small to generate detectable
impacts on outcomes (Dolton et al. 2011). We are able to address
all three of these limitations in our setting. In developing country
contexts, our results are consistent with other studies finding no
correlation between teacher salaries in the public sector and their
teaching effectiveness (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011a;
Bau and Das 2017), and with studies finding that contract teach-
ers who are paid much lower salaries than civil service teachers
are no less effective (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2013; Du-
flo, Dupas, and Kremer 2015; Bau and Das 2017).
Our results do not imply that salary increases for public em-
ployees would have no positive effects on service delivery in the
long run through extensive margin impacts. Dal Bo et al. (2013)
show that salary increases for public sector jobs in Mexico in-
creased the quality of job applicants, and Ferraz and Finan (2011)
find that higher wages for politicians in Brazil attracted more ed-
ucated candidates and improved politician performance. Longer-
term studies that include the extensive margin effects of new
teacher hiring have found a positive relationship between teacher
salaries and student outcomes (Card and Krueger 1992a, 1992b;
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Instead, our results contribute to a more informed discussion
on the cost-effectiveness of such a policy. Since the annual flow
of new workers is low relative to the stock of existing workers,
most extensive margin benefits would accrue far in the future. In
contrast, the costs of unconditional salary increases are incurred
immediately (and are mostly driven by increased pay for incum-
bent workers). We show that at reasonable discount rates, the
intensive margin effects have a considerably greater weight than
the extensive margin effects in determining the present value of
a policy of across-the-board pay increases. Thus, if there are no
intensive margin effects on productivity, implying that the ex-
tensive margin is the only channel for improved productivity,
then our results suggest that across-the-board salary increases
are a very inefficient way of improving education quality relative
to alternate uses for public education funds (see calculations in
Section V).
Several global education policy reports recommend increasing
teacher pay in low-income countries as a way to improve the mo-
tivation and performance of incumbent teachers (UNICEF 2011;
UNESCO 2014). Following a similar set of arguments, the Govern-
ment of Indonesia’s publicly stated rationale for the large salary
increase included the hope that it would improve teacher morale,
motivation, and job satisfaction, and thereby lead to increased
teacher effort and student learning (see Section II).5 Our results
suggest that although the policy improved welfare of incumbent
teachers, it yielded no corresponding improvement in the learning
of students taught by these teachers. Such evidence is especially
relevant for improving policy making in a public-sector setting,
where there is no market test of whether increasing employee
salaries also increases productivity, and where unconditional pay
raises are difficult to reverse.6
5. Note that politicians do not have to genuinely believe that higher salaries
will raise teacher effort and effectiveness. They could also strategically claim to
believe this because they need to present a plausible public interest reason for
raising teacher salaries in return for political support from teacher unions. In
practice, both the “ideas” and the “interests” are likely to matter, but the “ideas”
provide the stated rationale in both cases (see discussion in Section II).
6. In contrast, Henry Ford’s famous “five-dollar workday” led to a
similar doubling in wages and to sharp increases in worker productivity
(Raff and Summers 1987). Indeed, it is unlikely that Ford would have continued
paying high wages if productivity did not go up, whereas the Indonesian govern-
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FIGURE I
Map of Indonesia with 20 Selected Districts
The rest of this article is structured as follows: Section II
describes the Indonesian education context, the teacher certifica-
tion policy, and the mechanisms by which the policy could have
improved teacher effort. Section III describes our experiment (de-
sign, validity, and data collection); Section IV presents our main
results on the impacts on teacher welfare and student learning
outcomes. Section V interprets our results and discusses policy
implications; Section VI concludes. Tables A.1–A.8 and other ap-
pendixes are available in an Online Appendix.
II. CONTEXT, POLICY REFORM, AND RATIONALE
Indonesia has one of the largest school education systems
in the world, catering to a school-age population of more than
50 million across 34 provinces and over 500 districts. The coun-
try consists of thousands of islands spanning over 3,000 miles
from east to west (Figure I), making service delivery challenging.
Promoting school education was historically a higher priority for
Indonesia than for many other developing countries in South Asia
and Africa, and primary school enrollment rates in Indonesia ex-
ceeded 90% by the early 1980s (World Bank EdStats Database).
This priority on education was further formalized in 2000–2002,
when the new Indonesian constitution committed the government
so each year despite our results showing no impact on student learning outcomes.
But the government had no good way of knowing this ex ante in the absence of
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to spend at least 20% of its budget on education (a considerable
increase from before).
Policy deliberations on the best way to spend these extra re-
sources identified poor teacher quality and motivation as key lim-
itations on the performance of the Indonesian education system.
The ambitious education reforms of 2005 aimed to address this is-
sue. The highlight of these reforms was the Teacher Law of 2005,
which stipulated that teachers who met certain eligibility crite-
ria (being a civil service teacher, and holding either a four-year
university degree or a high rank in the civil service—typically ob-
tained through a long tenure) and who successfully completed a
certification process would receive a “professional allowance” (or
“certification allowance”) equal to 100% of their base pay (World
Bank 2010; Chang et al. 2014).7
The certification process was initially meant to include a high-
standard external assessment of teacher subject knowledge and
pedagogical practice, with an extensive skill-upgrading compo-
nent for teachers who did not meet these standards (featuring
up to a year of additional training and tests). However, teach-
ers’ associations opposed the high-standard certification exams.
Thus, by the time the final law and regulations were negotiated
through the political and policy-making process, the quality im-
provement stipulations had been highly diluted. They were re-
placed with a much weaker certification requirement that simply
required teachers to submit a portfolio of their teaching materi-
als and achievements. Even for those who did not pass the port-
folio evaluation, just two weeks of additional training were re-
quired to attain certification. In practice, the certification process
yielded a doubling of base pay with only a modest hurdle to be
surmounted.8
Prereform teacher salaries in Indonesia were lower than
teacher salary benchmarks in other Southeast Asian coun-
tries (which was part of the justification for the policy), but
7. Note that the professional allowance was 100% of base pay, rather than
of total precertification pay. Teachers often receive other allowances based on the
location of their job posting and taking on additional tasks, and so the allowance
increased total pay by 75% on average and by 65% for teachers who were eligible
for certification (see Table IV).
8. Very few teachers entering the certification process failed it. Furthermore,
even those who failed the first attempt were all certified after a two-week training
program, which mainly focused on helping teachers prepare the portfolios to be
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teachers were reasonably well paid even before the reform. Us-
ing representative household survey data from the 2012 Indone-
sian labor force survey (Sakernas, August 2012), we estimate
that prereform teacher pay was at the 50th percentile of the
college-graduate salary distribution. Civil service teachers also
enjoyed more generous benefits than equivalent workers in the
private sector and had high job security. Overall, teacher jobs
were attractive even before the reforms, and quit rates were very
low.
The reform led to a substantial increase in teacher salaries,
moving teacher compensation from around the 50th percentile
of the college-graduate salary distribution to the 90th percentile.
This large increase was not conditional on teachers’ subsequent
effort or effectiveness, but depended only on a one-time de-
termination that the teacher met some certification criteria.
Hence, for all practical purposes, the policy can be considered
as having resulted in an unconditional salary increase for el-
igible incumbent teachers. To the extent that undergoing the
certification process increased teacher human capital, our esti-
mates of the impact of certification will be an upper bound on
the intensive margin impacts of an unconditional increase in
pay.
The decision to implement a large teacher pay increase was
justified at least partly by the belief that higher pay would in-
crease teacher motivation and effort. Indeed, the pay increase
was widely referred to in policy documents as an “incentive,” sug-
gesting an implicit assumption by policy makers that there would
be positive effects on teacher motivation and effort (see Chang
et al. 2014). Although standard economic models do not predict
that workers will increase effort in response to an unconditional
increase in pay, this belief is common in the global policy litera-
ture on teacher quality and was also reflected in the Indonesian
policy discourse. For instance, UNESCO’s flagship Education for
All Global Monitoring Report claims that “low salaries are likely
to damage (teacher) morale” and “teachers often need to take on
additional work—sometimes including private tuition—which can
reduce their commitment to their regular teaching jobs and lead to
absenteeism” (UNESCO 2014). In Indonesia, one report claimed
that “low pay is likely to be one of the main reasons why teachers
perform poorly, and have low morale” (World Bank 2008), and an-
other that “teachers often have a high rate of absenteeism because
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their motivation and effectiveness in the classroom” (World Bank
2010).9
Online Appendix A illustrates how widespread this view is in
policy circles by presenting a fuller list of quotes and extracts from
prominent education policy documents in Indonesia and several
other countries, which claim that increasing teachers’ pay will
increase their motivation and effort. In Online Appendix B, we
formalize the economic arguments implied in these quotes from
practitioners, presenting simple theoretical sketches of mecha-
nisms by which teacher effort may increase in response to an un-
conditional pay increase and deriving comparative statics. These
include: (i) reciprocity and gift exchange in employment contracts;
(ii) a model in which effort on prosocial tasks like teaching is a nor-
mal good with a positive income elasticity; and (iii) a model where
the expected performance of teachers depends on their salary and
where sanctions or rewards are provided through community and
administrative monitoring based on performance relative to these
expectations.10
Of course, the belief that unconditional pay increases would
increase teacher morale, motivation, effort, and effectiveness is
unlikely to have been the only reason for a policy change. As with
any large policy change, the final Indonesian Teacher Law re-
flected a combination of “ideas” (people genuinely thinking that
the salary increase would improve education outcomes), “inter-
ests” (teacher unions effectively advocating for their interests),
and “institutions” (the spending floor on education in the new In-
donesian constitution allowed for a large increase in education
spending). However, while “ideas” are only one part of this causal
chain of action, they are especially important because they often
provide the stated rationale for “interests.” For instance, even if
policy makers did not truly believe that the reform would improve
education and only wanted to reward teachers in return for polit-
ical support, it may have made strategic sense for them to posit
9. The argument that higher teacher salaries can improve motivation and
performance appears in the U.S. literature as well. For instance, Hanushek, Kain,
and Rivkin (1999) note that in addition to the attraction and retention channel,
“Many influential reports and proposals advocate substantial salary increases as
a means of attracting and retaining more talented teachers in the public schools
and encouraging harder work by current teachers” (emphasis added).
10. We do not derive comparative statics for the “reduced shirking” channel of
efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), because this is unlikely to apply in a
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such effects as a plausible public interest justification for the pay
increase.
Thus, from a policy perspective, the private beliefs and pub-
licly stated rationales for the pay increase are less important than
the fact that it was implemented and was very expensive. Since
the pay increase could have improved the effectiveness of incum-
bent teachers through several channels, the goal of our study is not
to test any one channel of impact (which is not feasible); instead,
we test whether the large pay increase helped improve effort and
productivity of incumbent teachers through any mechanism. Evi-
dence on this question would inform future policy discussions on
the cost effectiveness of large unconditional salary increases for
incumbent civil service employees.
III. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
III.A. Design, Sampling, and Implementation
Because of the large number of teachers covered, teacher ac-
cess to the certification process was phased in. The budgetary
restrictions meant that only around 10% of teachers were allowed
to go through the certification process each year once the imple-
mentation of the certification process began in 2006. Each year,
each district was allocated a quota that indicated how many of its
teachers could start the certification process. The quota was typi-
cally allocated to teachers based on seniority, though districts had
some discretion in this process. Once a teacher was in the process,
he or she was practically guaranteed certification, as described
already. Other eligible teachers had to wait in a certification
queue, often for several years.
Our experimental design takes advantage of the phase-in pro-
cedure for teacher access to the certification process, and the ex-
istence of a certification queue. Rather than having teachers wait
in this queue, the intervention aimed to allow all eligible but not
yet certified teachers (whom we define as “target” teachers) in
treatment schools to immediately access the certification process
at the start of the experiment (in 2009). The experiment did not
change any of the requirements of certification specified in the
law and regulations, but simply allowed otherwise eligible teach-
ers in treatment schools to enter the certification process early,
rather than having to wait for a few more years. In other words,
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increase for teachers in treatment schools, but it did not change
the underlying program in any way. The experimental protocol
was implemented in close collaboration with the Ministry of Na-
tional Education of the Government of Indonesia, where senior
officials were committed to conducting a high-quality impact eval-
uation, and provided exemplary support in implementation.
We first identified a nearly representative sample of 360
schools across 20 districts of Indonesia to make up the universe
of the study. We started with the 2006 national teacher census,
which covered roughly 1,600,000 public primary and junior sec-
ondary teachers across 454 districts. Districts that were too small,
were too dangerous to visit, or were included in a parallel random-
ized evaluation were excluded,11 leaving us with 383 districts in
the sampling frame. These represented nearly 85% of the dis-
tricts and over 90% of the population of Indonesia. From these,
we randomly sampled 20 districts, stratified across the five major
regions of the country, with more districts assigned to regions with
a larger population. The list of districts sampled and the strata
they represent are presented in Table A.1. A map of the sampled
districts is presented in Figure I.12
Within each district, we stratified schools by the num-
ber of teachers, and sampled 12 primary and 6 junior
secondary schools.13 Thus, the study universe consisted of a
11. The district sampling for the two parallel sets of randomized evaluations
was conducted using the same procedures, so the 20 districts dropped on account
of not wanting spillovers between the studies were also a representative sample.
However, the second study (of a parallel initiative to set up teacher working groups)
ended up not being implemented. Districts dropped for access and safety reasons
had a much lower population on average.
12. As the scale in Figure I indicates, the east-to-west distance spanned by
Indonesia is greater than that of the continental United States, and our design
imposed considerable logistical complexity. However, the resulting random as-
signment in a nearly representative sample of schools provides greater external
validity to our results. See Heckman and Smith (1995) for a discussion of the
threats to external validity of experiments resulting from site-selection bias in
experimental studies. Allcott (2015) provides evidence of such bias. The five major
regions of Indonesia and the number of districts sampled in each of them (roughly
proportional to population) were Java (10), Sumatra (5), Sulawesi (2), Eastern
Indonesia (2), and Kalimantan (1).
13. We dropped the strata comprising schools with very large and very small
numbers of teachers. If schools were too large, it would not have been feasible to
test all the students in the school during the time the enumerators would have in
the school. If they were too small, they would not provide adequate power. Given
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near-representative sample of 240 primary (grades 1–6) and 120
junior secondary (grades 7–9) schools across 20 districts of In-
donesia. From this sample, 80 primary and 40 junior secondary
schools were randomly assigned to treatment status, while the
other 160 primary and 80 junior secondary schools were assigned
to a business-as-usual control group. Just like the sampling of
schools, the randomization was also stratified by district, school
type, and school size, and thus the design was identical across dis-
tricts, with each district being a microcosm of the overall study.14
To implement the experiment, the Ministry of National Ed-
ucation sent letters to the District Education offices with a copy
to the head teachers of treated schools informing them that all
eligible teachers in the selected schools had been granted imme-
diate access to the certification process and informing them about
the administrative steps they needed to take to begin the process
(a translated copy of this letter appears in Online Appendix C).
To ensure that other teachers would have no incentive to transfer
to treatment schools, only teachers who worked in the treatment
schools at the start of the experiment were eligible for this imme-
diate access.15 The budget for the extra certification slots needed
for the experiment was provided through supplementary funds
from the national government, and these slots were provided to
districts over and above their regular quota. Thus, the experiment
did not displace any other education spending in the districts from
control to treatment schools; nor did it displace any otherwise el-
igible teacher from certification.
The research design did not create any change in the schools
other than the additional quota allocation to treatment schools
teachers in the school, our results are likely to be representative of all schools,
even though the smallest and largest ones were not in the study universe.
14. Specifically, each of the 20 districts had 6 treatment schools (2 junior sec-
ondary; 4 primary) and 12 control schools (4 junior secondary; 8 primary). Schools
were stratified into triplets based on size, and one school in each triplet was as-
signed to treatment status. Note that because the intervention was expensive,
optimal sample allocation to maximize power yielded a larger control group than
treatment group. All our estimating equations will include district-triplet fixed
effects (since these are the strata within which we randomized treatment assign-
ment).
15. The letter also promised accelerated access to ineligible teachers in treat-
ment schools once they met the eligibility criteria (point 2 in the letter). As we
show later, there was only limited impact on the certification rate of those who
were not initially eligible, relative to the large impact on those who were eligible
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and the communication letter to head teachers of treatment
schools. The teachers in control schools continued business as
usual, with those who were eligible but not certified at the start
of the study progressing through the certification process at the
same rate as the rest of the country. Thus, our identifying vari-
ation comes from the sharp increase in the fraction of certified
teachers in the treatment schools induced by the experiment, con-
trasted with the gradual, business-as-usual increase in the control
schools.
The possibilities of spillovers to other schools were minimized
by making sure that there was no public announcement of the
additional quota: the eligibility for certification was communi-
cated only to the head teacher and teachers in treatment schools
through the letter that they received from the government. Fur-
thermore, within the treatment schools, the teachers who did not
receive access to the certification process were those who were in-
eligible for certification in any case (by virtue of not being a college
graduate or a civil service teacher, for example). As a result, the
experiment is less likely to have engendered resentment among
nontarget teachers in the school than in settings where the pay
increases might have been seen as arbitrary. Thus, by conducting
our study in a setting where the pay increases were in line with
preannounced policy criteria, we minimize the extent to which the
intervention could be considered ad hoc or unsustainable.
III.B. Project Timeline and Data
The school year in Indonesia runs from July to May, and the
study was carried out over three school years from 2009–10 to
2011–12. We refer to these three school years as Y1, Y2, and Y3 in
the article. The sampling and randomization of schools were con-
ducted during the school holidays before Y1, and the government
sent letters to treated schools informing them that all eligible
teachers in these schools would be able to access the certifica-
tion process at the start of Y1. The certification process (including
preparing and submitting the application and teaching portfolio,
having them evaluated, and receiving the certification) typically
took one full school year, and teachers typically were certified by
the end of Y1 and started receiving their certification allowance
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FIGURE II
Project Timeline
We carried out three waves of data collection, during which we
interviewed head teachers, teachers, and students; we conducted
independent tests of both teacher knowledge and student learning
outcomes. The first wave was a baseline collected in November
2009. The baseline was deliberately conducted a few months into
the school year (after the certification eligibility letters were sent
to treatment schools) so that we could interview teachers to verify
whether they had entered the certification process. The second
wave of data was collected in April–May 2011, at the end of two
years of the project (Y2), and the third wave was collected in April–
May 2012, at the end of three years (Y3).16 Figure II shows the
project timeline for the intervention and data collection.
We collected data on school facilities, finances, and other
school-level data from head teacher interviews. Teacher inter-
views included questions on demographics, experience, pay, out-
side jobs, income (from teaching and other sources), and job satis-
faction. We used a combination of school and teacher interviews to
map teachers to specific classrooms and subjects (which will not
be needed for the school-level ITT estimates but will be needed
for the IV estimates of the impact of being taught by a certified
16. Since the certification process took one year, the first year in which target
teachers in treatment schools would have received the additional allowance was
the second year of the project. We felt it was highly unlikely that there would
be any impact at the end of Y1 (since teachers in treatment schools would not
have received any additional payments at this point). Thus, given the high costs
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teacher). Students in all schools were tested using multiple-choice
tests of math, science, and Indonesian, and students in junior sec-
ondary schools were also tested in English. The tests also included
a short demographic survey to collect basic information on house-
hold assets from students.
III.C. Validity of Experimental Design
The randomization was successful in ensuring that treat-
ment and control schools were similar prior to the experiment.
There was no significant difference between treatment and con-
trol schools on school-level variables such as the number of stu-
dents, teachers, or class size (Table I, Panel A). There were also
no significant differences in student test scores across treatment
and control schools on test scores in any subject (math, sci-
ence, Indonesian, or English) or on an index of household assets
(Table I, Panel B).17 The differences in means in column (3) include
district-triplet fixed effects, since these triplets are the strata
within which we randomized treatment assignment, and the stra-
tum fixed effects will be included in our estimating equation for
treatment effects.
Teacher characteristics were also similar across treatment
and control schools. There were no significant differences on most
teacher-level variables, including teachers’ own test scores, their
certification status, their base pay, and the incidence of holding an
outside job (Table II, columns (1)–(3)). The only major difference
is that, as expected, teachers in treatment schools were 32 per-
centage points more likely to have entered the certification quota.
This difference confirms that the experiment successfully led to
many more teachers in treatment schools getting access to the
certification process.
We see the impact of the treatment even more clearly in
Table II, columns (4)–(6), which are restricted to the target teach-
ers who were “eligible but not certified” in either the treatment
or control schools at the start of the study. In this group, 73%
of teachers in treatment schools were in the certification quota;
whereas in the control schools, the rate was only 18% (indicating
the rate at which target teachers would have gotten certified in
17. Note that the randomization (and communication to target teachers) was
carried out before the baseline survey and hence the randomization could not be
balanced ex ante on these variables. Thus, it is reassuring to see that treatment
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TABLE I
BALANCE TESTS ON SCHOOL- AND STUDENT-LEVEL VARIABLES AT BASELINE
Treatment Control Difference (F.E.)
(1) (2) (3)
































Panel B: Balance test on student-level variables



































Notes. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Table compares average baseline values between treatment and
control groups based on a regression model that includes district-triplet fixed effects, which are the strata
used for randomization. Within-group standard deviations are reported in brackets in columns (1) and (2).
School-level clustered standard errors of the estimated difference between treatment and control are reported
in parentheses in column (3). For the student asset index, we calculate the fraction of the following seven
items that are available in the household of the student: television, fridge, mobile phone, bicycle, motor bike,
car, computer.
the absence of the experiment). We observe small differences in a
few other teacher characteristics that are attributable to random
sampling variation. The magnitude of these differences is small,
especially when compared with the differences in the fraction ad-
mitted to the certification quota. To control for these differences,
we also report results from a differences-in-differences specifica-
tion when we look at impacts at the teacher level.18
18. Teachers in treatment schools were slightly more likely to have a bachelor’s
degree but slightly less likely to have a senior civil service rank. These factors offset
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We also test for differential attrition and entry of students
over the period of the study. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the
different cohorts in our study, the years in which they were tested,
and which cohorts are in our estimation sample at different points
of the study. We find that there is no differential attrition among
students who were in our baseline test and who continue to be
in our estimation sample over time (Online Appendix Table A.4,
Panel A) and that there is no difference in attrition rates across
treatment and control groups as a function of baseline test scores
(Panels B and C). Finally, we find that the treatment did not in-
duce any compositional changes in incoming student cohorts over




The time path of the fraction of teachers in treatment and
control schools who had entered the certification process over the
three years of the study is shown in Figure III. Three points are
noteworthy. First, there was no difference between treatment and
control schools in the rate of teacher certification before the start
of the experiment in 2009. Second, the intervention introduced a
sharp increase in the fraction of teachers admitted to the certi-
fication process in treatment schools in 2009, even as the trend
in control schools remained constant. Third, the gap in fraction
of admitted teachers narrowed over time, as the eligible teachers
in the control schools gained access to the certification process
at a business-as-usual rate. Thus, the difference in the fraction
of teachers admitted to the certification process across treatment
and control schools is higher at the time of the baseline survey
(Y0) than at the end of Y2 and Y3.
As described earlier, teachers entered the certification process
at the start of each school year, completed the process over the
course of the year, got certified by the end of the year, and started
fraction of certification-eligible teachers across treatment and control schools (56%
versus 57%; columns (1) and (2)). There are small differences in precertification
pay, but these are less than 5% of the value of the certification pay. The significance
of these small differences is attributable to the very small standard errors obtained
from including the stratum fixed effects (the differences are mostly not significant
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FIGURE III
Fraction of Teachers Admitted to the Certification Process at or before the
Indicated Year
Teachers were admitted to the certification process at different points in time.
The first batch of teachers was admitted in 2006. The intervention took place in
2009, which created a difference between treatment and control schools in terms of
the fraction of teachers admitted to the certification program. The bars represent
fractions of teachers who were admitted to the certification program at or before
the indicated year. For example, around 60% of teachers in treatment schools were
admitted to the certification program in 2009 or before, against roughly 30% in
control. We use baseline data to construct the 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 bars, Y2 data
to construct the 2010 and 2011 bars, and Y3 data to construct the 2012 bar.
receiving their payments at the start of the next year. Thus, at the
time of the baseline there was no difference between treatment
and control schools in the fraction of teachers who were certified
or who had received the extra certification allowance. However,
both indicators had increased sharply by the end of Y2 and Y3
(Figure IV).
Table III, Panel A shows the differences in Figures II and IV,
along with tests of equality. In the first year, the share of teach-
ers in treatment schools who had entered the certification process
was 33 percentage points higher than (or more than double) that
in the control group, while no difference had yet appeared in the
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FIGURE IV
Completing the Certification Process (A) and Being Paid the Certification
Allowance (B).
Panel A presents the fraction of teachers who completed the certification process.
Panel B presents the fraction of teachers who completed the certification process
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Y2 and Y3, the difference in the fraction of teachers who had en-
tered the certification process falls to 17 and 7 percentage points,
respectively (since the control schools catch up over time). At the
end of Y2 (Y3), the fraction of teachers in treatment schools who
report being certified is 23 (14) percentage points higher, and the
fraction who report being paid the certification allowance is 28
(23) percentage points higher.
Note that the difference in the fraction of teachers who are
paid their certification allowance is higher than the difference in
the fraction who are certified (at the end of both Y2 and Y3). This
is as expected; many eligible teachers in the control schools would
have entered the certification process at the start of Y2 and Y3
and been certified at the end of Y2 and Y3, respectively, but would
have started getting paid their allowances only at the start of
the next school year. These teachers will therefore report being
certified but will not yet have started getting paid their allowance
at the time of the Y2 and Y3 surveys. On the other hand, teachers
in treatment schools who gained access to the certification process
at the start of Y1 will have completed certification by the end of
Y1 and started getting paid their allowances in Y2.19 Since most
of the posited mechanisms by which the pay increase would be
expected to improve teacher effort and student outcomes are based
on teachers actually receiving the extra pay, the most relevant
metric of the effective difference between treatment and control
schools for our study is the difference in the fraction of teachers
who have been paid their certification allowance.
We present the corresponding figures for the target
teachers—those who were eligible but not certified at the start
of the study—in Table III, Panel B. As expected, the differences
are more pronounced for this group. The target teachers in treat-
ment schools are 54 percentage points more likely to have entered
the certification process at the time of the baseline survey. At the
end of Y2 (Y3), they are 43 (24) percentage points more likely to be
certified, and 54 (45) percentage points more likely to have been
paid their certification allowance (Table III, Panel B).
19. Thus, the variation in the difference between treatment and control groups
across measures reported in Table III reflects variation in the year of entry into
the certification process and the time lag in the process. Once we control for year
of entry into certification, the difference between treatment and control schools in
the fraction of teachers who are certified and the fraction who are certified and
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Finally, we present the corresponding figures for the nontar-
get teachers, who were not eligible for certification at the start
of the experiment in Online Appendix Table A.3. The experiment
also aimed to provide accelerated access to certification to teach-
ers in treatment schools who became eligible for certification in
later years (as seen in point 2 in the letter in Online Appendix
C). However, as Online Appendix Table A.3 shows, very few of the
teachers who were not eligible at the start of the experiment get
certified and paid during the study (2% after Y2 and 3% after Y3).
Our estimates of intent-to-treat (ITT) effects at the school level
will include these teachers, and our instrumental variable (IV)
estimates will focus on teachers who were eligible at the start of
the study (where the first stage is the highest).
IV.B. Teacher-Level Outcomes
Table IV reports the impact of the experiment on teachers in
treated schools after two and three years. Columns (1)–(6) report
impacts for all teachers (which documents the first stage for the
school-level ITT effects), and columns (7)–(12) report impacts for
target teachers (which corresponds to the first stage for the IV
estimates of the impact of being taught by a teacher who received
the pay increase). We report both simple differences (with stratum
fixed effects) and differences-in-differences estimates that adjust
for differences in baseline value (whenever these are available).
We find that the accelerated access to the certification pro-
cess and the additional allowance had several positive impacts
on teachers that persisted both two years and three years into
the study. At the end of Y2 (Y3), teachers in treatment schools
received 112% (72%) more certification pay and 19% (15%) more
total pay compared to those in control schools.20 They were also
15% (12%) more likely to report being satisfied with their total
income, 18% (16%) less likely to report facing financial problems
and stress, 18% (18%) less likely to be holding a second job, and
20. These figures are presented in percentage changes relative to the mean in
the control group. Table IV presents the changes in percentage points. Calculations
in the text use the differences-in-differences estimates when available, and the
simple difference estimates otherwise. As an illustration, columns (1) and (3) of
Table IV show that the mean certification pay in the control group at the end of Y2
was 0.57M IDR (Indonesian rupiah) and that the treatment raised this by 0.64M
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spent 19% (16%, not significant) less time working on second jobs
(Table IV, columns (1)–(6)).
As we would expect, the impacts are stronger within the uni-
verse of target teachers. At the end of Y2 (and Y3), target teachers
in treatment schools received 274% (103%) more certification pay
and 31% (23%) more total pay than those in control schools. Note
that the certification allowance was 100% of base pay for teachers,
but that in practice, the increase over their total precertification
pay was around 65%–75% because the total pay (prior to certifi-
cation) included allowances in addition to their base pay.21 Com-
pared to their peers in control schools, target teachers in treat-
ment schools were also 28% (20%) more likely to report being
satisfied with their total income, 27% (31%) less likely to report
facing financial problems and stress, 19% (12%) less likely to be
holding a second job, and spent 22% (10%) less time working on
second jobs at the end of Y2 (Y3) (Table IV, columns (7)–(12)).22
Because eligible teachers in control schools would also be-
come eligible for certification over time, our experiment did not
induce a doubling in permanent income. Rather, it accelerated a
permanent doubling of base pay, and increased lifetime income for
target teachers by two to three years of base pay. Furthermore,
while eligible teachers in control schools may have been able to
anticipate their future increase in income, credit constraints may
have limited the extent to which they could borrow against future
income. Thus, the effects we report above on increased job satis-
21. It is easy to back this out from the numbers in Tables III and IV. In the
sample with all teachers, we see in Table III that 27% of teachers in the control
group had been paid the certification allowance in Y2, and see in Table IV that
the mean certification pay in the control group was 0.57M IDR. Thus, the average
certification pay among the teachers who were receiving it was 0.57M0.27 , which is
2.11M IDR. This is, as it should be, a 100% increase over the mean base pay of
2.08M IDR in the control group (Table IV, column (1)). Base pay plus allowances






The calculation can also be done with the target teachers, where we see that






control group, which is also 2.11M IDR. But since other allowances for senior civil
service teachers were higher, the total precertification pay for the “target” teachers






total pay on certification.
22. Results on incidence of second jobs and time spent on second jobs are often
not significant in Y3 (likely reflecting the weaker first stage of the treatment in
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faction, reduced financial stress, and reduced outside jobs should
be interpreted as the result of an increase in two to three years of
permanent income, as well as the liquidity effects of receiving the
extra income on hand.23
Overall, the teacher pay increase induced by our experiment
was successful in achieving the stated objectives of the certifica-
tion policy regarding teachers’ financial situation, job satisfaction,
and ability to better focus on teaching by reducing the need to hold
outside jobs. However, we find little evidence to suggest that teach-
ers in treatment schools put in greater effort in response to this
pay increase. We find no difference between treatment and control
schools on teacher test scores or the likelihood of pursuing further
education, suggesting that teachers did not use the extra time
available for their primary teaching job to upgrade their skills.
We also find no difference in self-reported absence rates in three
out of four comparisons in Table IV (last row, columns (3), (6), (9),
and (12)), suggesting that teacher effort may not have changed
much in treated schools.24
Nevertheless, as per the mechanisms described in Section II
(and Online Appendixes A and B), the reduced financial stress, re-
duced incidence of second jobs, and increased job satisfaction and
motivation could have led to an improvement in teacher effort in
the classroom, and effectiveness as measured by student learning
outcomes. We test for this possibility in the next section.
IV.C. Student Outcomes
1. ITT Estimates. Since the randomization was conducted at
the school level, we first present school-level ITT estimates. These
estimates quantify how student learning in a school responds to a
23. Note also that there is no reason to expect the experiment to affect the
teachers in the control schools. They already knew about the policy, and had access
to the certification process in exactly the same way as they would have had without
the experiment. The experiment only accelerated the pay increase for teachers in
treated schools, but did not change any way in which control schools experienced
the larger certification reform (the certification process was unchanged during the
period of the experiment).
24. The results in the last row of Table IV, column (9) suggest that teacher
absence was lower among target teachers in treated schools (who are the group we
would most likely see an effort response for). However, these results are based on
self-reports of absence, which limits our confidence in inferring impacts on teacher
effort. As a result, our primary outcome of interest is student learning, which we
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sharp increase in the fraction of the school’s teachers who have re-
ceived a large unconditional increase in pay. Our main estimating
equation takes the form:
Tijks (Yn) = β0 + β1a · Tijks (Y0) + β1b · Tijks (Y0) + β2 · Treatmentk
+ βZST · ZST + εi jks.(1)
The dependent variable of interest is Tijks, which is the nor-
malized test score of student i on subject s, where j, k, denote
the grade and school, respectively. T (Y0) indicates the baseline
tests, while T (Yn) indicates a test at period Y2 or Y3. Including
the normalized baseline test score improves efficiency, due to the
autocorrelation between test scores across multiple periods.25 We
also include a set of stratum fixed effects (ZST ), to account for
the stratification of the randomization. Finally, we include the
mean normalized baseline test scores across all students in the
school for the corresponding grade and subject (Tijks), which fur-
ther increases efficiency (Altonji and Mansfield 2014). The main
estimate of interest is β2, which provides an unbiased estimate of
the impact of being in a treatment school (the ITT estimate), since
schools were assigned to treatment status by lottery.
Table V presents these ITT estimates pooled across schools
and subjects; we see that there was no impact on test scores of be-
ing in a treated school, even though teacher salaries and satisfac-
tion had gone up substantially. The pooled effects across subjects
and school types have a point estimate of −0.01σ at the end of Y2
and 0.01σ at the end of Y3. These zero effects are precisely esti-
mated; the small standard errors of 0.025σ provide us adequate
power to detect effects as low as 0.05σ at the 5% level. Thus, not
only are the point estimates close to zero, but we can also reject
effect sizes greater than 0.04σ at the end of Y2 and greater than
0.06σ at the end of Y3. Online Appendix Table A.6 presents results
individually for each subject, by school type (primary and junior
secondary), and at the end of Y2 and Y3 (Panels A and B); the
25. As we show in Online Appendix Table A.2, some of the cohorts included
in our analysis did not have a baseline test. We set the normalized baseline score
to 0 for these students (similarly for students who were absent for the baseline
test but are present in the Y2 and/or Y3 tests) and include a dummy variable in
equation (1) that takes the value 1 when the lagged test score is missing and 0
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TABLE V









Notes. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. The table reports intent-to-treat effects on student-level test scores.
Estimates are reported separately for Y2 and Y3 data. Test score data are constructed by standardizing by
subject-grade-year (so that mean and variance in the control group are 0 and 1, respectively), then stacked so
that the unit of observation is student-subject-year. These test scores are then regressed on a dummy variable
indicating a treatment school. The estimated parameter on the treatment indicator is reported in columns (1)
and (2). The regression model further includes district-triplet fixed effects (the strata used for randomization),
baseline standardized student-level test scores, baseline standardized averaged school-level test scores. For
observations for which baseline test scores are not observed, the baseline values are set to 0. Two dummy
variables, indicating observations for which individual baseline test scores or school-averaged baseline scores
are not observed, are also included in the regression model. Weights are applied to scale the student-subject
level data back to the level of the student. School-level clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
results show that there is no effect on test scores in any subject at
either of the two time periods (columns (1)–(4)).
Figure V presents quantile treatment effects of being in a
treatment school, by plotting student test scores at each percentile
of the control and treatment school test score distributions after
Y2 and Y3 (Panels B and D). We see that the treatment effects are
not only zero on average but cannot be statistically distinguished
from zero at any part of the test score distribution. In Panels A
and C, we present the corresponding first-stage quantile plots,
which show the number of years that a student at each quantile
of the test score distribution spent with a certified teacher in a
treatment and control school. The figure makes clear that students
at every percentile of the test score distribution after Y2 and Y3
experienced a significant increase in their exposure to a certified
teacher, but that nevertheless there was no impact on learning
outcomes.
One possible concern in interpreting our school-level ITT es-
timates is that the estimated zero effects could reflect a combi-
nation of positive effects on students of target teachers (who may
be motivated to increase effort by the pay raise) and negative ef-
fects on students taught by nontarget teachers (especially those
who were not eligible for certification), who may have reduced ef-
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Quantile Treatment Effects [Panel B (Y2), Panel D (Y3)] and Quantile First
Stage [Panel A (Y2), Panel C (Y3)]
The nonparametric plots are constructed as follows. First, the outcome variable
is regressed on a full set of district-stratum dummy variables, the school averaged
baseline score (which is set to 0 when it is not observed), and a dummy variable
indicating observations for which the school-averaged baseline test scores are not
observed. The residuals of this regression are linked to the percentiles using a local
polynomial smoother. Percentiles on the horizontal axis are constructed separately
for the treatment and control group. The confidence bands are estimated using a
bootstrap method, and allow for residual dependence within schools.
certification allowance.26 We test for this possibility by decompos-
ing the impact on mean test scores shown in Table V into test score
impacts on students taught by target teachers and those taught
by nontarget teachers (across treatment and control schools). We
present the results in Table VI for both Y2 and Y3.
For the Y2 data, we consider whether a student was taught
by a target teacher in Y2 (since none of the target teachers would
have been paid the certification allowance in Y1), and test sep-
arately for treatment effects on students taught by target and
26. As described earlier, this was unlikely because the experiment did not
change any of the certification norms in the law, and thus there is no reason for
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TABLE VI




Conditional treatment effect for students with:
Target teacher in Y2 −0.004
(0.026)
Nontarget teacher in Y2 −0.001
(0.030)
Target in Y2 and Y3 −0.023
(0.033)
Target in Y2 and nontarget in Y3 0.055
(0.041)
Nontarget in Y2 and target in Y3 0.020
(0.039)
Nontarget in Y2 and Y3 0.029
(0.036)






H0: causal parameters are the
same (p-value)
.91 .26
H0: causal parameters are the
same and equal to zero (p-value)
.99 .37
Total student-subject observations 279,066 274,993
Notes. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. The table reports intent-to-treat effects on student-level test scores,
conditional on the target status of teachers. The regression model used is the same as the regression model
used for Table V results, except that the dummy variable indicating a treatment school is interacted with
a variable measuring the target status of a student’s teacher. For Y1 outcome data (column (1)) we present
causal parameters for students with target teachers in Y2, and for students who do not have target teachers
in Y2. For Y3 outcome data (column (2)) there are four categories, as indicated. For a minority of students
we could not match students to teachers (for example when teachers were absent during the field visit). For
column (1) results, about 5.6% of the student-test-level observations were not matched to teachers in Y2. For
column (2) results, about 12.2% of the student-level observations were not matched to teachers in both Y2 and
Y3. The treatment effects for the subgroup of students that are not matched to teachers are not statistically
significant, suggesting that the inability to match students to teachers does not cause biases. School-level
clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.
nontarget teachers (Table VI, column (1)). We see that there is
no effect on test scores of students in treatment schools taught
by either type of teacher relative to the control schools (point esti-
mates are zero) and cannot reject equality of test scores of students
taught by target and nontarget teachers in treatment schools.27
27. The table separately reports outcomes for the small fraction of students
(around 5% of observations) for whom we are not able to verify the target status
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For the Y3 data, we consider the four possible combinations
of teacher type that a student could have had in Y2 and Y3
(target – target; target – nontarget; nontarget – target; and non-
target – nontarget) and again find no significant difference in test
score outcomes across these categories between treatment and
control schools. When we focus on the most extreme comparison—
students taught by a target teacher in both Y2 and Y3, compared
with those taught by a nontarget teacher in both Y2 and Y3—we
still find no evidence that the former did better in treated schools
(Table VI, column (2)).
2. Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates. The ITT estimates
are at the school level and are based on a 29 (24) percentage point
increase in the fraction of certified and paid teachers in the treat-
ment schools at the end of Y2 (Y3) (Table III, Panel A). To estimate
the direct impact of being taught by a certified and paid teacher,
we instrument for being taught by a certified teacher using the
random assignment of treatment across schools. Specifically, we
aim to estimate:
Tijks (Y2) = β0 + β1a · Tijks (Y0) + β1b · Tijks (Y0)
+ β2 · C erti f iedijks (Y2) + βZST · ZST + εi jks,(2a)
Tijks (Y3) = β0 + β1a · Tijks (Y0) + β1b · Tijks (Y0)
+ β2
[
C erti f iedijks (Y3) + ϒ · C erti f iedijks (Y2)
]
+ βZST · ZST + εi jks,(2b)
where the coefficient of interest is β2, which estimates the impact
on student test scores for each year of being taught by a certified
teacher (with the additional pay), and the rest of the variables are
defined as in equation (1).
One technical consideration in estimating equation (2b) is
the issue of test score decay (or incomplete persistence) over time.
Estimates from several settings suggest that there is consider-
able annual decay in test scores, with the persistence parameter
ϒ (estimated as the coefficient on the lagged test score in a stan-
dard value-added model) typically being around 0.5 (Andrabi et al.
2011). It is not possible to consistently estimate the persistence
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at the same time (see the discussion in Andrabi et al. 2011 and
Muralidharan 2012). We therefore estimate equation (2b) for a
range of values of ϒ and present the resulting estimates of β2,
along with standard errors, in Table VII. The estimates with ϒ =
0 correspond to complete decay of any test score gains in a year
by the end of the next year, while those with ϒ = 1 correspond
to complete persistence. Based on several prior studies, our pre-
ferred estimates assume ϒ = 0.5.
The main threat to interpreting these estimates as the annual
impact of being taught by a certified teacher is the possibility of
endogenous reassignment of certified teachers within treatment
schools to potentially weaker students. We test for this in Online
Appendix Table A.7 and find that there is no significant differ-
ence across treatment and control schools in the probability of a
student being assigned to target teachers as a function of assets
or test scores during either Y2 or Y3 (Online Appendix Table A.7,
Panel A). We also find no difference in the probability of students
being assigned to a target teacher as a function of their incoming
test scores (based on comparing Y0 scores in Y2 and Y2 scores
in Y3), and whether they are above or below the median asset
ownership (Online Appendix Table A.7, Panels B–E).28
Table VII presents IV estimates of the impact of being taught
by a certified teacher for the full sample of students, as well as
for the sample of students taught by target teachers (which will
give us more precise IV estimates, since the first stage is more
powerful in this case). Focusing on students who were taught by
target teachers, we can reject a positive effect greater than 0.07σ
at the 95% level in the Y2 data. In the Y3 data, our preferred
estimate is the one where the sample includes students who were
taught by a target teacher in either Y2 or Y3, and we find that we
can reject a positive effect greater than 0.1σ at the 95% level.29
Finally, we examine heterogeneity of treatment effects as
a function of several school-level characteristics, including the
fraction of target teachers, the number of target teachers, mean
28. Note that we test for differential assignment of students to target teachers
as a function of the household asset index because we do not have baseline test
scores for many of the cohorts in our final estimation sample.
29. We also show the ITT effects for each estimation sample in Table VII to
enable a comparison between ITT and IV estimates. These are almost identical
since outcomes are similar across students taught by target and nontarget teachers
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student affluence, measures of school size, and mean baseline test
scores, and find no evidence of any heterogeneous effects (Online
Appendix Table A.8). Thus, the increase in teacher pay in treated
schools had no impact on student test scores, either in aggregate
or in any subset of the data.
V. COST EFFECTIVENESS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Before discussing cost effectiveness, we note that teacher
salary increases do not represent a social cost, because they are a
transfer from taxpayers to teachers. The social cost of the program
is the deadweight loss of raising tax revenue for the increased
salaries, combined with the cost of implementing the certification
program. However, developing countries typically face hard bud-
get constraints because of a limited ability to run deficits, and so
the cost of the policy may best be thought of as the opportunity
cost of potentially higher-return public spending that was crowded
out.30 To simplify our analysis, we limit the use of this opportunity
cost framework to other education expenditure. We assume that
there is a fixed education budget, and compare this program to
other education interventions that could have been implemented
with the same resources.
Because the salary doubling had no impact on test scores of
students taught by incumbent teachers, it is clear that the policy
was not cost effective as a way of improving the quality of edu-
cation for current students.31 Thus, the case for across-the-board
teacher salary increases as a policy option for improving student
learning would have to rely exclusively on longer-run impacts—
the possibility that, over time, education quality could improve
as higher-quality candidates enter the teaching profession. We
30. In principle, governments should be able to borrow to finance any project
that has a higher rate of return than the cost of borrowing. In practice, financial
markets find it difficult to evaluate the quality of public spending and impose a
sovereign risk interest rate penalty when fiscal deficits exceed a threshold. Thus,
in practice, choosing one form of public spending will reduce the fiscal space for
other policies, which motivates our opportunity cost approach.
31. In contrast, several other interventions have been able to achieve sub-
stantial test score gains for existing students in developing countries (see
Glewwe and Muralidharan 2016 for a review). Thus, if the policy goal of the gov-
ernment was to improve learning outcomes of current students, then it is likely
that one or more of these other programs could have been implemented in Indone-
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provide suggestive estimates on the potential magnitude of this
effect below.
Using data on teacher subject-knowledge test scores matched
to student value-added from the data set used in this study,
De Ree (2016) estimates that a 1σ increase in teacher test scores
predicts a 0.175σ a year increase in their effectiveness as mea-
sured by student value-added (the estimates are from page 28 of
De Ree 2016). So if we assume that the doubling of pay attracted
and led to the selection of teachers who have 1σ better subject test
scores than the current stock of teachers, the extensive margin ef-
fect would be to improve student test scores by around 0.175σ
a year in steady state after all current teachers have been re-
placed.32
Thus, in the long-run steady state, the policy may yield an
increase in student test scores of 0.175σ a year through extensive
margin effects at a cost of US$ 138 per student per year.33 How-
ever, other salary-related interventions in developing countries
have led to comparable increases in learning at much lower cost.
For instance, a program that provided individual performance-
based bonus pay to teachers in India achieved student test score
gains of 0.15σ a year (averaged across math and language) at an
annual cost of only about US$ 4 per student, including im-
plementation costs (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011a).34
32. The assumption is not unrealistic in theory because the pay increase
moved teacher salaries from the 50th to the 90th percentile of the distribution
of college-graduate salaries (a pay increase of over 1σ if salaries are normally
distributed). However, in practice, it is very optimistic since it assumes that the
teacher selection process would also be modified to select the higher-ability can-
didates who may be attracted to teaching by the higher pay, which was not the
case in the status quo. For instance, as of 2012 (six years after the reform), nearly
50% of recently recruited teachers (between 24 and 30 years of age) did not have
a bachelor’s degree, despite there being no shortage of college graduates with a
teaching degree, suggesting that status quo teacher hiring did not select the most
qualified candidates (World Bank 2015).
33. Costs were calculated by taking the monthly certification allowance (2.11M
IDR, from Section IV), multiplying this by 12 and the average number of teachers
(9.3, from Table I), and dividing by the average number of children in a school (190,
from Table I), using a 9,000 IDR per US dollar exchange rate from the period of the
experiment (2009–2012). Because it assumes no growth in real teacher salaries
over time, this is a conservative estimate of costs.
34. Incentive treatments cost up to 10,000 rupees per school. Per student
costs are obtained by dividing by average student in school (113), and then using
an exchange rate of 44 rupees to the dollar (in the years of the experiment, 2005–
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Expressed as a fraction of teacher base pay (since India and In-
donesia have different levels of GDP per capita), the performance
pay program in India cost 6% of base pay (3% each for bonus and
implementation costs), while the across-the-board salary increase
in Indonesia cost 100% of base pay. Thus, even when consider-
ing the potential long-term steady-state benefits of the pay in-
crease on learning outcomes, it is likely that an alternative policy
of performance-linked pay increases would be much more cost-
effective.
Three further considerations suggest that across-the-board
salary increases are even less cost-effective from a social welfare
perspective. First, such increases result in large and immediate
fiscal costs by increasing pay levels of incumbent workers. Thus,
the short- and medium-term benefits (net of costs) depend largely
on the magnitude of the intensive margin effects (which we show
to be zero), while most of the extensive margin effects accrue only
far in the future, as older cohorts of teachers retire and newer
cohorts join the teacher work force. In Online Appendix D, we
show that at a discount rate of 7% (which is the interest rate
on 10-year Indonesian government bonds), the intensive margin
effects of a policy of raising salaries across the board have a weight
three times greater than that of the extensive margin effects in
calculating the present value of the policy.
Specifically, if Ei and Ee are the steady-state annual intensive
and extensive margin effects on student learning, respectively,
we show that the present value of the discounted stream of
benefits from the policy is equal to (Ei × 15) + (Ee × 5). We also
show that if the annual steady-state cost of the salary increase
is C, then the present value of the discounted stream of costs
will be (C × 15).35 In other words, if Ei is zero (as we find), and
cost of implementing the program as equal to the costs of the bonuses; including
the implementation cost would double the per child cost to US$4 per student,
which is the figure we use.
35. The present discounted value of a continuous stream of annual costs C, is
equal to C1−δ , where δ is the discount factor, which is equal to
1
1+r , where r is the
discount rate. Thus, if r is 7%, then 11−δ is 15.28, yielding the estimate in the text.
The multiple for the intensive margin effect (Ei) is analogous since this effect also
starts immediately. However, the multiple for the extensive margin effect (Ee) is
lower because these benefits only phase in over time (see calculations in Online
Appendix D). Note also that from a public budgeting perspective, C and E should
be expressed in dollars to determine whether an investment has a positive rate of
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the discount rate is 7%, then the present discounted value of the
stream of costs is over 15 times higher than the annual figure
(since the costs start immediately), while the present discounted
value of the stream of benefits is only five times higher (since the
gains from Ee appear only in the longer run). The calculation also
highlights the importance of the intensive margin effects for the
present-value calculation, and shows how our results inform cost-
effectiveness calculations. If Ei were positive instead of zero, the
present value of the benefits of the salary increase could be much
higher.
Second, even if such an increase raises the quality of new en-
trants into the teaching profession, it is not obvious that this will
improve social welfare, because that talent would be displaced
from other sectors in the economy (unlike policies that improve
the effectiveness of existing teachers). Although it is possible that
the social returns of attracting more talented individuals to teach-
ing may be higher than the costs to the sector they are displaced
from, there is no evidence of this. Furthermore, since public-sector
management quality and productivity is typically lower than that
of the private sector (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010), it is possi-
ble that higher-quality human capital may be less productive in
the public sector and that the displacement reduces aggregate
output.36
Third, an alternative policy that links at least some of the
pay increases to performance is likely to not only yield positive
intensive margin effects, but also be more effective on the ex-
tensive margin. This is because increasing the spread of worker
economic return) is not well documented in most countries. We therefore follow the
spirit of the discussion in the opening paragraph of this section: we think about
E in terms of standard deviations of test scores, and we focus on the relative cost
effectiveness of different policies aimed at improving test scores.
36. For instance, Schuendeln and Playforth (2014) present evidence from In-
dia suggesting that educated workers prefer to join the government sector (which
has high wages and high private returns) even though the social returns of the
government sector are low. More recently, Bau and Das (2017) show that there
is no correlation between teacher value-added and teacher pay in the public sec-
tor in Pakistan, while there is a positive correlation between the two in private
schools, suggesting that the private sector is able to manage employees better
(by rewarding performance). Finally, another underappreciated cost of salaries
in the public sector being high relative to market norms is that it could induce
corruption in recruitment into government jobs and induce negative selection of
candidates who are willing to pay bribes to obtain well-paid lifetime employment
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pay to more closely reflect their productivity is also likely to
attract higher-ability candidates, compared with an across-the-
board increase in salaries on a compressed schedule with no
links to performance (Lazear 2000). In the context of education,
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011b) find that teachers in
India who are ex ante more willing to accept a mean-preserving
spread in pay linked to their performance are the ones who are
more effective ex post. Thus, while increasing teacher compensa-
tion across the board may have some positive long-term effects
on education outcomes through its effects on teacher quality, our
results and the discussion above suggest that there may be much
more cost-effective ways of improving education outcomes.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article has offered new evidence on a key ques-
tion in public-sector personnel economics: how does a large,
unconditional increase in salary affect the job performance of in-
cumbent employees? This is an important policy question because
most of the cost of unconditional salary increases is devoted to
paying higher salaries for these incumbents. The value of evidence
on this question is especially important in public-sector contexts,
where there is no market test of whether such an increase is a
cost-effective way of improving the effort and effectiveness of em-
ployees.
We answer this question with a large-scale randomized ex-
periment in the context of a policy change in Indonesia that led
to a permanent doubling of base teacher salaries. The experi-
ment was implemented successfully, leading to a large increase
in teacher incomes in treated schools. It also substantially im-
proved the intermediate variables through which policy makers
hoped the increase in salary would lead to better education qual-
ity: teachers in treated schools were significantly more likely to
be satisfied with their income, significantly less likely to report
financial stress, and significantly less likely to hold a second job
than teachers in control schools.
Yet despite this improvement in teachers’ pay and satisfac-
tion, we find no effect on teacher effort toward upgrading their own
skills, no consistent evidence of changes in self-reported teacher
attendance, and no effect on the ultimate outcome of student
learning. The test score impact of being in a treated school is
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the 95% level in treated schools. Similarly, the test score impact
of being taught by a certified teacher who had received the pay
increase was also close to zero, and we can rule out positive test
score effects larger than 0.1σ at the 95% level. Thus, it appears
that the large increase in teacher salaries was mostly a transfer to
teachers without any corresponding improvement in productivity.
Advocates of higher pay for teachers frequently assert that it
would improve the motivation, effort, and effectiveness of exist-
ing teachers (as discussed in Online Appendixes A and B). These
ideas influence the broader public discourse on education, con-
tributing to expensive policy changes of the sort implemented in
Indonesia. Our results suggest that this hypothesis is not sup-
ported by the evidence. Furthermore, while our study was not
designed to test specific mechanisms (such as gift exchange and
reciprocity, or more effective supervision) by which unconditional
salary increases may improve the effort and effectiveness of in-
cumbent employees, our results suggest that none of these posited
channels applied in our setting of civil service workers with high
job security.
These results are directly relevant to policy debates—around
the world, and especially in developing countries—regarding
whether across-the-board salary increases for teachers (and other
public-sector employees) are a cost-effective strategy for improv-
ing their productivity and the quality of service delivery more
broadly. While such pay increases could improve the quality of en-
trants into teaching and improve student learning in the longer
run, these extensive margin effects will appear only after many
years, while the costs are borne immediately (mainly for spending
on incumbent workers). Our calculations show that if the inten-
sive margin effects are zero, leaving the extensive margin as the
only channel of impact, then unconditional salary increases are
unlikely to be a cost-effective policy option for improving the qual-
ity of service delivery.37
More broadly, our results are consistent with a growing body
of evidence showing that wages of public-sector workers in de-
veloping countries are typically not correlated with productivity
(see Das et al. 2016 for evidence from public-sector health care
37. One policy option that mitigates this problem is to have the higher salaries
apply only to new recruits (thereby obtaining extensive margin benefits without
the intensive margin costs on incumbent workers that may not raise effort and







/qje/article/133/2/993/4622956 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 26 M
arch 2021
1036 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
workers, and Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011a and Bau
and Das 2017 for evidence from education). Whereas much of
the existing evidence is correlational, we provide experimental
evidence that unconditional pay increases do not increase public-
sector worker productivity. Conversely, the fact that the policy was
implemented is consistent with the hypothesis that public-sector
compensation policy does not reward productivity; this may help
explain why management quality is lower in public organizations
than in private firms, which are significantly more likely to com-
pensate service providers for greater productivity (Bloom and Van
Reenen 2010; Bau and Das 2017).
Compared to these changes in level of compensation, re-
forms to the structure of public-sector worker compensation (espe-
cially using performance-linked bonuses) appear more promising
as a strategy for improving service delivery (Muralidharan and
Sundararaman 2011a). However, implementing such reforms at
scale in public-sector settings is much more challenging. Given
the centrality of front-line worker effort and productivity to ser-
vice delivery in developing countries, there are likely to be large
returns to future research on the personnel economics of the pub-
lic sector, and specifically on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of
policies to improve public-sector worker productivity.
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An Online Appendix for this article can be found at The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics online. Data and code replicating the
tables and figures in this article can be found in De Ree et al.
(2017), in the Harvard Dataverse, doi:10.7910/DVN/MTVM5O.
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